Markets are changing and they are being driven by the sheer power of the great powers. This competition is driven by unique structural drivers that lead to their incentives and goals for continued survival. Amidst this change, public markets are being actively reshaped, heralding new opportunities as the regime dramatically evolves.
Key to forecasts for how markets will change, are projections of what great powers will do. This involves analysing their current goals and suite of options. Thereafter will financial flows follow.
The level of analyis involves understanding how each state effectively makes decisions. They are comprised of unique instituions and governing bodies, each with varying mandates and internal influence. Another factor would be the strength of a given domestic economy, as well as how domestic politics do or do not affect political decision-making.
Security selection demands an understanding of what firms are, of which no two are alike. While business theory is useful in valuation and assessing cashflows - there is still a strong need to understand how capital flows might be distorted due to strategic, and other economically-agnostic considerations. Firms are at once both political and business creatures. Their relevance to state interests and their reputation among the public greatly defines their nature, which affects how they will be treated and what their fortunes are. Thus, business unit analysis and financial modelling must be accompanied such macro-meta-considerations.
I present a track record of an actively traded portfolio. I intend to present live date and quarterly reports on performance. I also want to display stock pick and trades taken on.
Current goals are to reach a strong 20% per annum return, with a good sharpe ratio and replicability across a time-period of at least 12 quarters. Due to the expected nature of the strategy, uncorrelated returns are likely to be gained, however concentration risk will be a problem. This can be mitigated with diversity of opportunities across a wide enough universe. Constraints in the strategy involve unsophisticated financial markets and higher expected transaction costs and illiquidity at times.
Dated: August 2025
Expect continued American use of coercive financial-economic tools. This will somewhat soften on the condition that tangible progress and commitments are made by allies. This includes a clear re-shaping of trade ties towards American interests, rather than deepening ties with China. Another indicator is overt security exchanges, such as access and provisions for American force - especially increased commitment towards security provisioning. Examples include increased presence by Japan via JSDF patrols of the South China Sea, which is somewhat happening. If this continues, then expect markets to settle selectively according to geopolitical posture of host states and exposure. This means 1) clear improvement in broad markets that align or consequently do not have a clear path through US-China posturing (Japanese stocks, some SEA stocks, EU defence) 2) strong control by states for SOEs and firms linked to strategic industries (state-led chip firms or solar buildouts reducing capacity by the Chinese state), which suggests selective opportunities as protectionism and state-subsidies continue (AMD, INTEL, PLTR) and 3) regulatory blind spots as states compete, structural rules are relaxed, and other third-party agents (such as global wealth) shape capital inflows to select opportunities (selective tech. firms, infrastructure buildouts, and private equity unwinding or lack thereof).
This suggests a current position of over positioning on continued American spending on defence. Positions for upswings in EU and amenable states that would see lower volatility via American-led threats in the coming months. Tactical positions in the economies which are re-positioning actively to defend both themselves, and also close free-riding behaviour (seen in Japan particularly) to align more closely. Last, cheap valuations in other secular trends with weak current governance see good immediate gains.
The latter is leading me to currently explore regional tech. firms and the introduction of financialisation across emerging markets.
(US-China; August 2025) America will continue to push for tariffs and strong-arm allies: I view tariffs and other tools by the United States, as under Trump, to be mere tools that are being deployed. These are simply the most immediate and available tools they have among a suite of policy options to achieve their goals. Their goals, in the long-term at least, is to address Chinese influence and combat the threat from the perspective of a great power. That means the US is much more interested in getting allies to actively contribute, or else gain direct concessions in a more blatant show of support for American interests.
All other news and media that misses this point should be ignored. Most attacks against American moves ignores the fact that short-term losses are not prioritised. Instead, the American view seems to be that long-term gains and clear commitment is needed. This makes sense when considering that trends suggest growing Chinese strength at current projections (see the Chinese naval buildout, manufacturing capacity, and ability to reshape the gravity, if not fully displace, of finance - such as the reserve currency status of USD and central banking arrangements). What is also missed that to maintain Pax Americana, many in the developed world were indeed free-riding on American provisions of security and the underpinnings of the trading system. This is fast changing as China sets out with the strength to compete with America from within the system, such as through deep capital provisions and control, thus we are witnessing the American response to reshape the system and bolster it with overt commitment from allies.
Seen this way, there will be continued American threats of tariffs on erstwhile allies, so long as their goals are not met. We can see a softening of this position as allies give concessions and re-align with stronger commitment.
(Link to full report forthcoming)
Demographic reform in Japan and the chance of economic revitalisation in Japanese markets.
The under-sold potential of SEA in reform and consumer spending power.
Parasitical positioning within American firms for financial services, and some private-equity inclined tech. firms inclined towards infrastructure.
Financial Markets as downstream from great powers. I want to explain how the global financial system is a series of arrangements largely driven by central banking policy. That is in turn shaped by domestic politics and the strength of the reserve dollar. This is underpinned in some part by American primacy, but also self-reinforcing. This interacts with other states and their respective sovereignty to mould the international landscape. That also leads directly to how capital flows are shaped by the centres of wealth and into certain states. The point is that the domestic economics and institutional structure of domestic economies affects international foreign policy. This is backed by power. That in turn affects international economic flows. Which can then shape financial markets and access of capital to certain firms. We can then choose these firms. If we were to only focus on the business case or economic analysis, we would be caught off-guard by regime change and non-economic logic employed by many other actors.
(Link to full report forthcoming)
Financial returns as linked to state interests. Sovereign wealth funds are used as tools as well. Capital allocations can be 'inefficiently' deployed, as with lending and other overt allocations via SWFs. Opportunities abound from accurate positioning ahead of such forecasts.
(Link to full report forthcoming)
I am an avid follower of public markets and global financial systems. I have particular interest in how domestic economies interact to shape international finance and the structure of market rules. I have a background in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, from an undergraduate degree in the National University of Singapore. I also have a masters degree in philosophy, specialising in decision theory, rational choice, and social epistemology (the study of knowledge as it is socially transmitted). In my graduate years, I focused on understanding what makes for a rational choice and how we can make good decisions in the face of issues such as uncertainty, the inability to aggregate well across very small odds or very large payoffs, and how we might be certain that we know what is reported to us and what we report to each other.
Investing is a tangible way to carry through my interests in the world. I believe that the world can not only be understood, but that it can also be well explained. I also deeply enjoy being correct about forecasts, and having a good payoff to accompany that. I think that political-economy explains much of the interactions we see, and I have always been interested in economics, how we transfer risk, the nature of institutions as they are construed, and finance as a means for exposure, risk management, and capital allocation.
It is simply exciting to see how finance interacts with the real economy and structural effects of global markets, alongside geopolitical-drivers. If you'd like to hear more or engage with my work, please feel free to reach out. I am always happy to talk and develop ideas.
You can find me at <attemptedthoughts@gmail.com>.